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Abstract
When an outside innovating firm has a technology to produce a higher quality good than
the good produced at present, it can sell licenses of its technology to incumbent firms, or
enter the market and at the same time sell licenses, or enter the market without license. We
examine the definitions of license fee in such a situation in an oligopoly with three firms
under vertical product diﬀerentiation, one outside innovating firm and two incumbent
firms, considering threat by entry of the innovating firm using a two-step auction. Also
we show that in the case of uniform distribution of consumers’ taste parameter and zero
cost when the quality improvement (the diﬀerence between the quality of the high-quality
good and the quality of the low-quality good) is small (or large), the two-step auction is
(or is not) credible.
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1. Introduction
In Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman (1986) it was argued that in an oligopoly when the
number of firms is small (or very large), strategy to enter the market and at the same time
license the cost-reducing technology to the incumbent firm (entry with license strategy) is more
profitable than strategy to license its technology to the incumbent firm without entering the
market (license without entry strategy) for the innovating firm. However, their result depends
on their definition of license fee. They defined the license fee in the case of licenses without
entry by the diﬀerence between the profit of an incumbent firm in that case and its profit before
it buys a license without entry of the innovating firm. However, it is inappropriate from the
game theoretic view point. If an incumbent firm does not buy a license, the innovating firm
may punish the incumbent firm by entering the market. The innovating firm can use such a
threat if and only if it is a credible threat. In a duopoly case with one incumbent firm, when
the innovating firm does not enter nor sell a license, its profit is zero; on the other hand, when
it enters the market without license, its profit is positive. Therefore, threat by entry without
license is credible under duopoly, and then even if the innovating firm does not enter themarket,
the incumbent firm must pay the diﬀerence between its profit when it uses the new technology
and its profit when the innovating firm enters without license as a license fee.
However, in an oligopoly with more than one incumbent firms, the credibility of threat by
entry is a more subtle problem. In this paper we extend the analysis to an oligopolistic situation
with three firms, one outside innovating firm and two incumbent firms under vertical product
diﬀerentiation, and examine the definitions of license fee for producing a higher quality good
than the good produced at present considering a two-step auction in the case of licenses without
entry1. A two-step auction, for example, in the case of a license to one incumbent firm without
entry is as follows.
(1) The first step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which is
equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below. A firm with the
maximum bidding price gets a license. If both firms make bids at the same price, one
firm is chosen at random. If no firm makes a bid, then the auction proceeds to the next
step.
(2) The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry.
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the new technology
without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys
the license with entry of the innovating firm.
1Hattori and Tanaka (2016b) presented an analysis of license and entry choice by an innovating firm in a
duopoly under vertical product diﬀerentiation.
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In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm does
not make a bid. On the other hand, it does not have an incentive to make a bid when the other
firm makes a bid.
We need the eﬀective minimum bidding price because if the minimum price does not
function eﬀectively, when one of the incumbent firms makes a bid which is slightly but strictly
smaller than this price, the other firm does not have an incentive to outperform this bidding.
A two-step auction in the case of licenses to two incumbent firms without entry is similar2,
and at the first step of the auction the incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license
fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when both firms use the new technology without
entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license
with entry of the innovating firm.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm
makes a bid because if it does not make a bid, the auction proceed to the next step.
Threat by such a two-step auction is credible if and only if the profit of the innovating firm
when it enters the market with a license to one firm is larger than its profit when it licenses to
one incumbent firm without entering the market.
It is diﬃcult to obtain the complete results under general distribution function of consumers’
taste parameter and general cost function. Therefore, we present basic formulation of general
case and detailed analysis of the uniform distribution of consumers’ taste parameter and zero
cost case.
In the next section we present literature review. In Section 3 the model of this paper is
described. In Section 4 we consider various equilibria of the oligopoly. In Section 5 we
present the license fees under entry with license strategy. In Section 6 we consider a two-step
auction and present the definitions of license fees under license without entry strategy. We
will show that in the case of uniform distribution and zero cost when the quality improvement
(the diﬀerence between the quality of the high-quality good and the quality of the low-quality
good) is small (or large), the two-step auction is (or is not) credible. In Section 7 we study
the optimal strategy for the innovating firm, whether it should enter or not, to how many firms
it should sell licenses, in the case of uniform distribution and zero cost, and will show that
when the two-step auction is credible, license to two firms without entry strategy is optimal.
On the other hand, when it is not credible, entry without license strategy is optimal. Section
9 is a concluding section. In Appendix we present analyses of demand and inverse demand
functions.
2. Literature review
Various studies focus on technology adoption orR&D investment in duopoly or oligopoly. Most
of them analyze the relation between the technology licensor and licensee. The diﬀerence of
means of contracts, which comprise royalties, upfront fixed fees, combinations of these two,
2Please see Section 6.2.2.
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and auctions, are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985)). Kamien and Tauman (2002)
showed that outside innovators prefer auctions, but industry incumbents prefer royalty. This
topic is discussed by Kabiraj (2004) under the Stackelberg oligopoly; here, the licensor does
not have production capacity. Wang andYang (2004) considered the case when the licensor has
production capacity. Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail, namely,
when the licensor is an outsider and when it is an incumbent firm, using the combination of
royalties and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity was externally given,
and they did not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside
innovators, who can use the entry as a threat, require more discussion. Regarding the strategies
of new entrants to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) focused on future entrants with
old technology, and argued that a low license fee can be used to deter the entry of potential
entrants. However, the firm with new technology is incumbent, and its choice of entry is
not analyzed. Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of the endogenous market structure
determined by the potential entrant with old technology and showed that the licensor uses the
fixed fee and zero royalty in both the incumbent and the outside innovator cases, which are
exogenously given. Creane, Chiu and Konishi (2013) examined a firm that can license its
production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs, and showed
that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under
weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the industry.
A Cournot oligopoly with fixed fee under cost asymmetry was analyzed by La Manna
(1993). He showed that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower cost firm always has
the incentive to transfer its technology; hence, while a Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be
fully asymmetric, there exists no non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. On the
other hand, using cooperative game theory, Watanabe and Muto (2008) analyzed bargaining
between a licensor with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms. Recent research
focuses on market structure and technology improvement. Boone (2001) and Matsumura et.
al. (2013) found a non-monotonic relation between intensity of competition and innovation.
Also, Pal (2010) showed that technology adoption may change the market outcome. The
social welfare is larger in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition. However, if
we consider technology adoption, Cournot competition may result in higher social welfare
than Bertrand competition under a diﬀerentiated goods market. Hattori and Tanaka (2015)
and (2016a) studied the adoption of new technology in Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg
duopoly. Rebolledo and Sandonís (2012) presented an analysis of the eﬀectiveness of research
and development (R&D) subsidies in an oligopolistic model in the cases of international
competition and cooperation in R&D. Hattori and Tanaka (2016b) analyzed problems about
product innovation, that is, introduction of higher quality good in a duopoly with vertical
product diﬀerentiation.
3. Themodel
Ourmodel of vertical product diﬀerentiation is according toMussa andRosen (1978), Bonanno
and Haworth (1998) and Tanaka (2001). There are three firms, Firms A, B and C. Firm A can
produce the high-quality good whose quality is kH , and Firms B and C produce the low-quality
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good whose quality is kL, where kH > kL > 0. kH and kL are fixed. Both of the high-quality
and the low-quality goods are produced at the same cost.
At present only Firms B and C produce the low-quality good. FirmA is an outside innovator,
and it may sell licenses to use its technology for producing the high-quality good to one or two
incumbent firms (Firms B and C), and it can enter the market with the high-quality good. Call
Firm A the innovating firm and Firms B and C the incumbent firms.
Firm A has five options.
(1) To enter the market, and license its technology to no incumbent firm.
(2) To enter the market, and license its technology to one incumbent firm.
(3) To enter the market, and license its technology to two incumbent firms.
(4) To license its technology to one incumbent firm, but does not enter the market.
(5) To license its technology to two incumbent firms, but does not enter the market.
The cost function of the goods is c./, which is twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
There is a continuum of consumers with the same income, denoted by y, but diﬀerent values
of the taste parameter  . Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. If a consumer with
parameter  buys one unit of a good of quality k at price p, his utility is equal to y   pC k.
If a consumer does not buy any good, his utility is equal to his income y. The parameter  is
distributed according to a twice continuously diﬀerentiable distribution function  D F./ in
the interval 0 <   1. We assume that there is no atom.  denotes the probability that the
taste parameter is smaller than or equal to  . The size of consumers is normalized as one. The
inverse function of F./ is denoted by G./. Note that G.1/ D 1.
Let pL and qL be the price and supply of the good of quality kL; pH and qH be the price
and supply of the good of quality kH ; and let qA, qB and qC be the outputs of Firms A, B and
C.
4. Equilibria of oligopoly
4.1. Entry without license
Suppose that Firm A (the innovating firm) enters into the market without license to Firm B
nor C. Then, Firm A supplies the high-quality good and Firms B and C supply the low-quality
good. Let L be the value of  for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between
buying nothing and buying the low-quality good. Then,
L D pL
kL
:
Let H be the value of  for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
the low-quality good and buying the high-quality good. Then
H D pH   pL
kH   kL :
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Let qH D qA and qL D qB C qC . The inverse demand function is described as follows.
(1) When qH > 0 and qL > 0, we have pH D .kH   kL/G.1  qH /C kLG.1  qH   qL/
and pL D kLG.1   qH   qL/.
(2) When qH > 0 and qL D 0, we have pH D kHG.1   qH / and pL D kLG.1   qH /.
(3) When qH D 0 and qL > 0, we have pH D kH   kL C kLG.1   qL/ and pL D
kLG.1   qL/.
(4) When qH D 0 and qL D 0, we have pH D kH and pL D kL.
Since G.1/ D 1, this is a continuously diﬀerentiable function with the domain 0  qH  1
and 0  qH  1. For details of derivation of the inverse demand function please see Appendix
A.3.
The profits of Firms A, B and C are written as
A D Œ.kH   kL/G.1   qA/C kLG.1   qA   qB   qC /qA   c.qA/;
B D kLG.1   qA   qB   qC /qB   c.qB/;
C D kLG.1   qA   qB   qC /qB   c.qC /:
Uniform distribution and zero cost case
Specificallywe assume that D F./ has a uniformdistribution. Then,  D  ,  D G./ D ,
F 0./ D G 0./ D 1 and F 00./ D G 00./ D 0. Moreover, we assume that the high-quality
and the low-quality goods are produced at zero cost. Denote kH D tkL; t > 1. The profits of
Firms A, B and C are written as
A D Œ.kH   kL/.1   qA/C kL.1   qA   qB   qC /qA;
B D kL.1   qA   qB   qC /qB ; C D kL.1   qA   qB   qC /qB :
The first order conditions for the firms, the equilibrium prices, the equilibrium outputs and
profits of Firms A, B and C are
.kH   kL/.1   qA/C kL.1   qA   qB   qC /   kHqA D 0;
kL.1   qA   qB   qC /   kLqB D 0; kL.1   qA   qB   qC /   kLqC D 0;
pH D kL.3t   2/
2.3t   1/ ; pL D
kL
2.3t   1/; qA D
3t   2
2.3t   1/; qB D qC D
t
2.3t   1/;
A D kLt .3t   2/
2
4.3t   1/2 ; B D C D
kLt
2
4.3t   1/2 :
Denote the equilibrium profits of Firms A, B and C in this case by e0A , e0B and e0C .
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4.2. Entry with license to one firm
Suppose that Firm A enters into the market and licenses its technology for producing the
high-quality good to one of the incumbent firms. We assume that it is Firm C. Then, Firms A
and C produce the high-quality good, and Firm B produces the low-quality good. The inverse
demand function is the same as that in the previous case with qH D qA C qC and qL D qB .
Denote the license fee in this case by Le1. The profits of Firms A, B and C are
A D Œ.kH   kL/G.1   qA   qC /C kLG.1   qA   qB   qC /qA   c.qA/;
B D kLG.1   qA   qB   qC /qB   c.qB/;
C D Œ.kH   kL/G.1   qA   qC /C kLG.1   qA   qB   qC /qC   c.qC /   Le1:
Uniform distribution and zero cost case
In the case of uniform distribution and zero cost the profits of Firms A, B and C are written as
A D Œ.kH   kL/.1   qA   qC /C kL.1   qA   qB   qC /qA;
B D kL.1   qA   qB   qC /qB ;
C D Œ.kH   kL/.1   qA   qC /C kL.1   qA   qB   qC /qC   Le1:
The first order conditions for the firms, the equilibrium prices, the equilibrium outputs and
profits of Firms A, B and C are
.kH kL/.1 qA qC /CkL.1 qA qB qC / kHqA D 0; kL.1 qA qB qC / kLqB D 0;
.kH kL/.1 qA qC /CkL.1 qA qB qC / kHqC D 0; pH D kLt.2t   1/
2.3t   1/ ; pL D
kLt
2.3t   1/;
qA D 2t   1
2.3t   1/; qB D
t
2.3t   1/; qC D
2t   1
2.3t   1/;
A D kLt .2t   1/
2
4.3t   1/2 ; B D
kLt
2
4.3t   1/2 ; C D
kLt.2t   1/2
4.3t   1/2   L
e1:
Denote the equilibrium profits of Firms A, B and C by e1A , e1B and e1C .
4.3. Entry with licenses to two firms
Suppose that Firm A enters into the market and licenses its technology for producing the
high-quality good to both incumbent firms. Then, all firms produce the high-quality good.
Let 0 be the value of  for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
nothing and buying the high-quality good. Then
0 D pH
kH
:
Let qH D qA C qB C qC . The inverse demand function is described as follows.
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(1) When qH > 0, we have pH D kHG.1   qH /.
(2) When qH D 0, we have pH D kH .
Since G.1/ D 1, this is a continuously diﬀerentiable function. About details for derivation of
the inverse demand function please see Appendix A.1.
Denote the license fee in this case by Le2. The profits of the firms are
A D kHG.1   qA   qB   qC /qA   c.qA/;
B D kHG.1   qA   qB   qC /qB   c.qB/   Le2;
C D kHG.1   qA   qB   qC /qC   c.qC /   Le2:
Uniform distribution and zero cost case
In the case of uniform distribution and zero cost the profits of Firms A, B and C are written as
A D kH .1   qA   qB   qC /qA;
B D kH .1   qA   qB   qC /qB   Le2;
C D kH .1   qA   qB   qC /qC   Le2:
The first order conditions for the firms, the equilibrium prices, the equilibrium outputs and
profits of Firms A, B and C are
kH .1 qA qB qC / kHqA D 0; kH .1 qA qB qC / kHqB D 0; kH .1 qA qB qC / kHqC D 0;
pH D kLt
4
; qA D qB D qC D 1
4
;
A D kLt
16
; B D C D kLt
16
  Le2:
Denote the equilibrium profits of Firms A, B and C by e2A , e2B and e2C .
4.4. License to one firmwithout entry
Suppose that FirmA sells a license of its technology to one of the incumbent firms and does not
enter the market. We assume that it is Firm C. Firm B still produces the low-quality good. The
inverse demand function is the same as that in the entry without license case with qH D qH
and qL D qB . Denote the license fee in this case by Ll1. The profits of Firms B and C are
B D kLG.1   qB   qC /qB   c.qB/;
C D Œ.kH   kL/G.1   qC /C kLG.1   qB   qC /qC   c.qC /   Ll1:
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Uniform distribution and zero cost case
In the case of uniform distribution and zero cost the profits of Firms A, B and C are written as
B D kL.1   qB   qC /qB ;
C D Œ.kH   kL/.1   qC /C kL.1   qB   qC /qC   Ll1:
The first order conditions for the firms, the equilibrium prices, the equilibrium outputs and
profits of Firms B and C are
kL.1   qB   qC /   kLqB D 0; .kH   kL/.1   qC /C kL.1   qB   qC /   kHqC D 0;
pH D kLt .2t   1/
4t   1 ; pL D
kLt
4t   1; qB D
t
4t   1; qC D
2t   1
4t   1;
B D kLt
2
.4t   1/2 ; C D
kLt .2t   1/2
.4t   1/2   L
l1:
Denote the equilibrium profits of Firms B and C by  l1B and  l1C .
4.5. Licenses to two firms without entry
Suppose that Firm A sells licenses of its technology to two incumbent firms and does not enter
the market. Then, Firms B and C produce the high-quality good. The inverse demand function
is the same as that in the entry with licenses to two firms case with qH D qB C qC . Denote
the license fee in this case by Ll2. The profits of the firms are
B D kHG.1   qB   qC /qB   c.qB/   Ll2;
C D kHG.1   qB   qC /qC   c.qC /   Ll2:
Uniform distribution and zero cost case
In the case of uniform distribution and zero cost the profits of Firms A, B and C are written as
B D kH .1   qB   qC /qB   Ll2;
C D kH .1   qB   qC /qC   Ll2:
The first order conditions for the firms, the equilibrium prices, the equilibrium outputs and
profits of Firms B and C are
kH .1   qB   qC /   kHqB D 0; kH .1   qB   qC /   kHqC D 0;
pH D kLt
3
; qB D qC D 1
3
;  l2B D  l2C D
kLt
9
  Ll2:
Denote the equilibrium profits of Firms B and C by  l2B and  l2C .
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5. License fees in the cases of licenses with entry
In the cases of licenses with entry the license fees are equal to the usual willingness to pay for
the incumbent firms. We follow the arguments by Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Sen and
Tauman (2007) about license fees by auction.
5.1. License to one firm
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the technology for
producing the high-quality good with entry of the innovating firm and its profit
when only the rival firm buys the license with entry of the innovating firm.
This is because each incumbent firm knows that there will be one licensee regardless of whether
or not it buys a license. The incumbent firms B and C have the same willingness to pay, so
even when one of them does not make a bid, the rival firm gets the license. The license fee is
Le1 D .e1C C Le1/   e1B :
This equation means e1C D e1B . In the case of uniform distribution and zero cost we have
Le1 D kLt.2t   1/
2
4.3t   1/2  
kLt
2
4.3t   1/2 D
kL.t   1/t.4t   1/
4.3t   1/2 :
5.2. Licenses to two firms
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this case is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the technology for producing
the high-quality good with entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only
the rival firm buys the license with entry of the innovating firm.
This is because each incumbent firm knows that there will be one licensee when it does not buy
a license. In this case there is a minimum bidding price which is equal to the willingness to
pay for the incumbents because without the minimum bidding price no firm makes a positive
bid. The license fee is
Le2 D .e2C C Le2/   e1B :
This means e2C D e1B . In the case of uniform distribution and zero cost we have
Le2 D kLt
16
  kLt
2
4.3t   1/2 D
kL.t   1/t.9t   1/
16.3t   1/2 :
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6. License fees in the case of licenses without entry:
two-step auction
6.1. One-step auction
If the licenses are auctioned oﬀ to the incumbent firms by one-step auction, the license fee is
determined by the usual willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described in Kamien and
Tauman (1986) and Sen and Tauman (2007).
6.1.1. License to one firm
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the technology for
producing the high-quality good without entry of the innovating firm and its profit
when only the rival firm buys the license without entry of the innovating firm.
Then, the license fee is
Ll1 D . l1C C Ll1/    l1B :
This equation means  l1C D  l1B . Denote Ll1 in this case by QLl1. In the case of uniform
distribution and zero cost we have
QLl1 D kLt .2t   1/
2
.4t   1/2  
kLt
2
.4t   1/2 D
kL.t   1/t
4t   1 :
6.1.2. Licenses to two firms
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this case is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the technology for producing
the high-quality good without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only
the rival firm buys the license without entry of the innovating firm.
In this case there is a minimum bidding price which is equal to the willingness to pay for the
incumbents. The license fee is
Ll2 D . l2C C Ll2/    l1B :
This means  l2C D  l1B . Denote Ll2 in this case by QLl2. In the case of uniform distribution
and zero cost we have
QLl2 D kLt
9
  kLt
2
.4t   1/2 D
kL.t   1/t.16t   1/
9.4t   1/2 :
6.2. Two-step auction
We consider a two-step auction for each case.
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6.2.1. License to one firm
In this case the two-step auction is practiced as follows.
(1) The first step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which is
equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below. A firm with the
maximum bidding price gets a license. If both firms make bids at the same price, one
firm is chosen at random. If no firm makes a bid, then the auction proceeds to the next
step.
(2) The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry. Then, the
willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this step is
e1C C Le1   e1B :
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the technology for
producing the high-quality good without entry of the innovating firm and its profit
when only the rival firm buys the license with entry of the innovating firm.
Then, the license fee is
Ll1 D . l1C C Ll1/   e1B :
This equation means  l1C D e1B . Denote Ll1 in this case by OLl1. In the case of uniform
distribution and zero cost we have
OLl1 D kLt.2t   1/
2
.4t   1/2  
kLt
2
4.3t   1/2 D
kLt.144t
4   256t3 C 156t2   41t C 4/
4.3t   1/2.4t   1/2 :
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid with the license fee OLl1
when the other firm does not make a bid. On the other hand, it does not have an incentive to
make a bid when the other firm makes a bid.
We need the eﬀective minimum bidding price OLl1 because the profit of a non-licensee is
 l1B which is larger than e1B . If the minimum price does not function eﬀectively, when one of
the incumbent firms makes a bid which is slightly but strictly smaller than this price, the other
firm does not have an incentive to outperform this bidding.
6.2.2. Licenses to two firms
We consider the following two-step auction
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(1) The first step.
The innovating firm sells licenses to two firms at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which is
equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below, and both firms
make bids. If both firms make bids, they get licenses. If at least one of the firms does
not make a bid, then the auction proceeds to the next step.
(2) The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry. Then, the
willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this step is
e1C C Le1   e1B :
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the technology for producing
the high-quality good without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only
the rival firm buys the license with entry of the innovating firm.
The minimum bidding price should be equal to this willingness to pay. Then, the license fee is
Ll2 D . l2C C Ll2/   e1B :
This means  l2C D e1B . Denote Ll2 in this case by OLl2. In the case of uniform distribution
and zero cost we have
OLl2 D kLt
9
  kLt
2
4.3t   1/2 D
kLt.36t
2   33t C 4/
36.3t   1/2 :
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm
makes a bid because if it does not make a bid, the auction proceeds to the next step.
6.3. Credibility of two-step auction
The innovating firm uses a two-step auction if and only if the threat by the existence of the
second step of the auction is credible, and it is credible if and only if the total profit of the
innovating firm when it enters the market with a license to one firm is larger than its profit
when it does not enter and sells a license to one firm. Therefore, if
e1A C Le1  QLl1;
the two-step auction is credible. On the other hand, if
QLl1 > e1A C Le1;
the two-step auction is not credible.
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Uniform distribution and zero cost case
Comparing e1B and  l1B in the case of uniform distribution and zero cost,
e1B    l1B D  
kLt
2.2t   1/.10t   3/
4.3t   1/2.4t   1/2 < 0:
Thus, threat by entry with a license to the rival firm is more severe than non-entry with license
to the rival firm for the incumbent firms. The total profit of the innovating firm when it enters
the market with a license to one firm is
e1A C Le1 D
kLt.8t
2   9t C 2/
4.3t   1/2 :
On the other hand, the profit of the innovating firmwhen it sells a license to one firm conditional
on that it does not enter the market is QLl1.
Comparing them,
e1A C Le1   QLl1 D  
kLt.2t   1/.2t2   7t C 2/
4.3t   1/2.4t   1/ :
This is positive if q <
p
33C7
4
, and is negative if q >
p
33C7
4
. Therefore, we obtain the following
result.
Proposition 1. In the case of uniform distribution of consumers’ taste parameter and zero
cost, if t 
p
33C7
4
, the two-step auction is credible, and if q >
p
33C7
4
, the two-step auction is
not credible.
This means that when the quality improvement (the diﬀerence between the quality of the
high-quality good and the quality of the low-quality good) is small (or large), the two-step
auction is (or is not) credible.
We illustrate the relations among q, QLl1 and e1A C Le1 in Figure 1.
Comparing OLl1 and QLl1 yields
OLl1   QLl1 D kLt
2.2t   1/.10t   3/
4.3t   1/2.4t   1/2 > 0:
We illustrate the license fee in the case of license to one firm without entry in Figure 2. It
is discontinuous at q D
p
33C7
4
. Since OLl1 > QLl1, we can define that the license fee when
q D
p
33C7
4
is
kLt .144t
4   256t3 C 156t2   41t C 4/
4.3t   1/2.4t   1/2 D
OLl1:
Comparing OLl2 and QLl2 yields
OLl2   QLl2 D kLt
2.2t   1/.10t   3/
4.3t   1/2.4t   1/2 > 0:
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Figure 1: Relations among q, e1A C Le1 and QLl1
We illustrate the license fee in the case of licenses to two firms without entry in Figure 3. It is
also discontinuous at q D
p
33C7
4
. Since OLl2 > QLl2, we can define that the license fee when
q D
p
33C7
4
is
kLt.36t
2   33t C 4/
36.3t   1/2 D
OLl2:
Note that we do not assume any specific value of each variable. Therefore, the results of this
section are general for situations of uniform distribution and zero cost.
7. The optimal strategy for the innovator
In this section we examine the optimal strategy for the innovator using the case of uniform
distribution and zero cost. It is determined by comparing its payoﬀ in various situations. We
consider two cases. One is a case where the two-step auction is credible, and the other is a
case where the two-step auction is not credible.
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Figure 2: License fee in the case of license to one firm without entry
7.1. Case 1: Two-step auction is credible
When 1 < q 
p
33C7
4
, the two-step auction is credible. Then, we have to compare the
following payoﬀs of the innovator.
e0A W Entry without license strategy;
OLl1 W License to one firm without entry strategy;
2 OLl2 W Licenses to two firms without entry strategy;
e1A C Le1 W Entry with license to one firm strategy;
e2A C 2Le2 W Entry with licenses to two firms strategy:
The values of them other than e2A C 2Le2 are obtained in the previous sections. The total
profit of the innovating firm when it enters the market with licenses to two firms is
e2A C 2Le2 D
kLt .27t
2   26t C 3/
16.3t   1/2 :
Please see Figure 4. In this case 2 OLl2 is the maximum. Thus, license to two firms without
entry strategy is optimal for the innovator.
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Figure 3: License fee in the case of licenses to two firms without entry
7.2. Case 2: Two-step auction is not credible
When q >
p
33C7
4
, the two-step auction is not credible. Then, we have to compare the following
payoﬀs of the innovator.
e0A W Entry without license strategy;
QLl1 W License to one firm without entry strategy;
2 QLl2 W Licenses to two firms without entry strategy;
e1A C Le1 W Entry with license to one firm strategy;
e2A C 2Le2 W Entry with licenses to two firms strategy:
Please see Figure 5. In this case e0A is the maximum. Thus, entry without license strategy
is optimal for the innovator.
We have shown the following results.
Proposition 2. In the case of uniform distribution of consumers’ taste parameter and zero
cost, if the two-step auction is credible, license to two firms without entry strategy is optimal
for the innovator, and if the two-step auction is not credible, entry without license strategy is
optimal.
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Figure 4: Comparison of payoﬀs of the innovator: Case 1
8. Concluding remarks and the future research
We have examined the definitions of license fees for the technology to produce a higher quality
good than the good produced at present developed by an outside innovator in an oligopoly
under vertical product diﬀerentiation when the innovator may enter the market with or without
licensing. In the future research we will investigate the optimal strategy, to sell licenses to one
or two incumbent firms without entry, or to enter the market with or without license, for the
innovating firm based on the definitions of license fees presented in this paper under general
distribution and cost functions, and we want to extend the analysis to more general oligopolistic
setting with n  3 incumbent firms.
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Appendix
A. Detailed analysis of demand functions
If a consumer with taste parameter  buys one unit of a good of quality k at price p, his utility
is equal to y   p C k. Let 0 be the value of  for which the corresponding consumer is
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Figure 5: Comparison of payoﬀs of the innovator: Case 2
indiﬀerent between buying nothing and buying the high-quality good. Then,
0 D pH
kH
:
Let L be the value of  for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
nothing and buying the low-quality good. Then,
L D pL
kL
:
Let H be the value of  for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
the low-quality good and buying the high-quality good. Then
H D pH   pL
kH   kL :
We find
0 D .kH   kL/H C kLL
kH
:
Therefore, L  0  H or H > 0 > L.
For  > .</L,
y   pL C kL > .</y:
For  > .</0,
y   pH C kH > .</y:
For  > .</H ,
y   pH C kH > .</y   pL C kL:
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A.1. Licenses to two firms without entry
In this case Firms B and C produce the high-quality good. Let qH be the demand for the
high-quality good. Then, we get
(1) When pH  kH (0  1), we have qH D 0.
(2) When pH < kH (0 < 1), we have qH D 1   F.0/.
The inverse demand function is described as follows.
(1) When qH > 0, we have pH D kHG.1   qH /.
(2) When qH D 0, we have pH D kH .
This is a continuously diﬀerentiable function with the domain 0  qH  1. We have
qH D qB C qC .
A.2. Licenses to two firms with entry
In this case all firms produce the high-quality good. Let qH D qA C qB C qC . The inverse
demand function is the same as that in Case A.1.
A.3. License to one firmwithout entry
In this case Firm C produces the high-quality good, and Firm B produces the low-quality good.
Let qH be the demand for the high-quality good and qL be the demand for the low-quality
good. Then, we get3
(1) When pH  kH (0  1) and pL  kL (L  1), we have qH D 0 and qL D 0.
(2) When pH < kH (0 < 1) and pL  pHkH kL (L  0  H ), we have qH D 1   F.0/
and qL D 0.
(3) When pL < kL (L < 1), pH > pLkL kH (H > 0 > L) and pH   pL  kH   kL
(H  1), we have qH D 0 and qL D 1   F.L/.
(4) When pL < kL (L < 1), pH > kHkL pL (H > 0 > L) and pH   pL < kH   kL
(H < 1), we have qL D F.H /   F.L/ and qH D 1   F.H /.
From this demand function we obtain the inverse demand function as follows.
(1) When qH > 0 and qL > 0, we have pH D .kH   kL/G.1  qH /C kLG.1  qH   qL/
and pL D kLG.1   qH   qL/.
(2) When qH > 0 and qL D 0, we have pH D kHG.1   qH / and pL D kLG.1   qH /.
3We owe this formulation to an anonymous referee.
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(3) When qH D 0 and qL > 0, we have pH D kH   kL C kLG.1   qL/ and pL D
kLG.1   qL/.
(4) When qH D 0 and qL D 0, we have pH D kH and pL D kL.
This is a continuously diﬀerentiable function with the domain 0  qH  1 and 0  qL  1.
We have qH D qC and qL D qB .
A.4. Entry with license to one firm
In this case Firms A and C produce the high-quality good, and Firm B produces the low-quality
good. The inverse demand function is the same as that in Case A.3 with qH D qA C qC and
qL D qB .
A.5. Entry without license
In this case Firm A produces the high-quality good, and Firms B and C produce the low-
quality good. The inverse demand function is the same as that in Case A.3 with qH D qA and
qL D qB C qC .
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